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The discovery of mirror neurons in the 1990s has led to much 
excitement in the cognitive neurosciences. After the initial 
discovery more and more abilities have been attributed to 
these neurons. As mirror neurons are commonly viewed as 
vehicles of representation, we analyze the increasingly wider 
representational role mirror neurons play and argue for a 
principled distinction between mirror and non-mirror neurons.  
Keywords: mirror neurons; representation; action 
recognition; goal understanding. 
Introduction 
In 1992 Di Pellegrino and his colleagues discovered that 
neurons in the rostral part of the inferior premotor cortex of 
the macaque brain fire both during the execution and the 
observation of an action (1992). Because of the double 
representational role these neurons play, they were later 
dubbed ‘mirror neurons’ (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et 
al., 1996). The discovery of mirror neurons caused great 
excitement in the cognitive neurosciences, as these neurons 
seem to offer a solid, neuronal base for the coupling of 
perception to action. Over time, more and more abilities 
were attributed to these neurons. Mirror neurons were 
deemed to be involved in the inference of intentions and 
goals (Fogassi et al., 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Rizzolatti, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), imitation (Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Iacoboni et al., 1999; Wohlschläger & Bekkering, 2002), 
emotion understanding (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006; Wicker 
et al., 2003) and complementary action (Newman-Norlund 
et al., 2007). Also mirror properties were connected to other 
modalities such as hearing (Keysers et al., 2003) and touch 
(Keysers et al., 2004) and found in other brain regions 
(Gallese et al., 2002). 
The attribution of increasingly general abilities to mirror 
neurons has diminished the original clarity on what mirror 
neurons are, what they do and how they could be capable of 
performing the functions attributed to them. For example, a 
debate has risen about whether mirror neurons show that 
direct matching of low-level motor activity is sufficient for 
describing the coupling of perception to action (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004), or that it should still be accompanied by 
the goal-directed hypothesis (Erlhagen, Mukovskiy & 
Bicho, 2006; Koski et al., 2002). Also, the use of mirror 
neurons as support for the simulation theory of mind 
reading (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) has been questioned 
(Csibra, 2005, 2007; Saxe, 2005).  
An analysis of the characterizing properties of mirror 
neurons and the representational roles they may and may 
not play can prove helpful to distinguish between neurons 
that could rightfully be called ‘mirror neurons’ and neurons 
that have other – nevertheless interesting – properties.  
Mirror Neurons as Representations 
When one wants to emphasize the special character of 
mirror neurons, one naturally adopts a representational point 
of view. For example, when Gallese et al. (1996, p. 606) 
speculate upon the role of mirror neurons, they state that 
“[a]nother possible function of mirror neuron movement 
representation is that this representation is involved in the 
‘understanding’ of motor events”. Likewise, Rizzolatti et al. 
(1996, p. 131) propose that “that [mirror neuron’s] activity 
‘represents’ the observed action.” The idea that mirror 
neurons carry representational content is based on 
covariance as measured, in particular by single cell 
recordings. Every time the monkey executes a particular 
movement or observes that particular movement being 
executed by the experimenter, a neuron fires. 
Representations based on covariance are ubiquitous in 
daily life. For instance, we regard the gas meter a 
representation of the amount of fuel in our tank precisely 
because there is a reliable covariance between the angle of 
the meter and the level of fuel in the tank. There have been 
arguments showing that a reliable covariance is neither a 
sufficient (Haugeland, 1991) nor a necessary (Millikan, 
1984) condition for representation, but we want to jump 
over these foundational difficulties, as we do not want to 
argue for or against the representational view in general (see 
e.g. Beer (2000), Clark (1997), Haselager, De Groot & Van 
Rappard, (2003) and Markman & Dietrich (2000) for 
various positions in this debate). 
A representation consists of a vehicle and a content and 
relates to a user and an object. These elements have been 
visualized in figure 1. The vehicle of a representation is the 
physical carrier (e.g. neural state) that represents. The 
information that is carried by the vehicle is called its 
content. Content is not the same as the object that is 
represented. An object or event in the outside world can be 
misrepresented or the content can be of a more general or 
more abstract nature than the object represented (e.g. “a 
sparrow” can get represented as “a bird”). The fourth and 
final element of a representation is a user. The user is the 
system or process that uses the representation to guide its 
1783
behavior. As the user is mostly unspecified in case of mirror 
neuron representations, we will pay little attention to this 
aspect of representation here.  
 
 
Figure 1: The four aspects of a representation.  
 
In their influential study, Gallese et al. (1996) recorded the 
activity of single cells in the brain of a monkey that was 
performing actions or observing actions made by the 
experimenter. Because certain neurons appeared to fire both 
during the observation and execution of an action, these 
neurons were dubbed mirror neurons. Not all neurons 
responded similar in terms of congruence to the actions, 
which led Gallese et al. to discriminate three categories of 
mirror neurons: strictly congruent, broadly congruent and 
non-congruent. Mirror neurons of the strictly congruent 
category get triggered by observed and executed movements 
that correspond both in terms of general action (e.g. 
grasping) and in terms of the way in which that action was 
executed (e.g. precision grip). These neurons can be seen as 
the archetypical mirror neurons. 
During action observation, the object of the representation 
of the strictly congruent mirror neuron is the movement of 
the experimenter or the movement of another monkey. 
During action execution, the object of this representation is 
the movement of the monkey. In both cases the content of 
the representation is the particular action (the means 
towards an end, for example grasping through a precision 
grip). The content is abstracted from the performer of the 
movement, as the neurons fire equally in response to 
movements made by the monkey or the experimenter, so no 
information on the executer is included here. The neuron 
itself is the vehicle of the representation.  
We can now reformulate what is special about this type of 
neurons: one neuronal vehicle covaries its activities with 
two objects or events of apparently different domains 
(action and perception) that share the same representational 
content. Neurons ‘mirror’ when different objects share a 
common property that gets reflected in the activity of the 
vehicle.  
 
Representational Content and Levels of 
Abstraction 
With the broadly congruent mirror neurons things are not as 
straightforward. These neurons display a connection, but not 
identity, between the observed and executed action and 
appear to be more specific on the motor side than on the 
perceptual side. Gallese et al. (1996) discern three groups of 
broadly congruent mirror neurons. Neurons of group 1 are 
highly specific for motor activity in terms of action and 
specific type of grip, but respond to the observation of 
various types of grips. An example of a neuron of this group 
is a neuron that fires only when the monkey grasps an object 
using a precision grip, and not with any other type of grip, 
but also when the experimenter grasps the object with 
various kinds of grips, unlike strictly congruent neurons, 
that fire only at the observation of one specific grip type. 
So, when speaking at the level of grips, it is not possible to 
specify the shared property, and hence the representational 
content of these neurons cannot be formulated. However, 
congruence can be found one level up, i.e. the level of 
actions, because from this perspective the response profile is 
equally specific on the motor and perception side, namely 
actions, e.g. grasping. The key property that mirror neurons 
of the strictly congruent type owe their name to – the fact 
that the common property of two different events gets 
reflected in the activity of one vehicle – can be preserved, 
but only by moving the description of the shared property 
from the level of grips on to the level of actions.  
Neurons of group 2 become active during one motor 
action with a hand, but visually respond to two or more 
different hand actions. Like the neurons of group 1, the 
content is more detailed on the motor side than on the 
observation side. Here the congruence is only preserved for 
categories of actions. This demands climbing yet another 
level of generality, i.e. by distinguishing hand actions and 
non-hand actions. So the representational content of these 
neurons can only be described at this level of broad action 
categories.  
The activation of neurons of group 3 is dependent on the 
goal of an action, regardless of how it was achieved. These 
action-dependent neurons are neither specific on the motor 
side, nor on the perception side. The level on which 
congruence can be found is even higher than that of neurons 
of group 2, as hand actions (for example grasping as well as 
other actions (grasping with the mouth) can serve a common 
goal (grasping to eat)). 
According to Gallese et al. (1996), mirror neurons of the 
non-congruent group exhibit no clear-cut relationship 
between the observed action and the movement of the 
monkey. So their claim is that the response profile of these 
neurons is too different on the perceptual and motor side to 
find a level of analysis in which a shared property can be 
found. At first sight, this makes it impossible to specify or 
characterize the representational content of these individual 
neurons, as it is difficult to find an informative description 
of the property on motor and perception side that the neuron 







Table 1: The various mirror neurons arranged according to their congruence at different levels of abstraction. 
   
Type of mirror neuron Response profile 
(M=Motor, V=Visual) 
Lowest common property in motor and 
visual response profile 
 
Non Congruent M: Various actions 
V: Various actions 
 
Object-related actions 
Broadly Congruent group 3 M: Specific action 
V: Various actions 
 
Specific goals (grasping to eating) 
Broadly Congruent group 2 M: Specific hand action 
V: various hand actions 
 
Specific category of actions (e.g. hand 
actions) 
Broadly Congruent group 1 M: Specific grip 
V: Various grips 
 
Specific action (e.g. grasping with a hand) 
Strictly Congruent M: Specific grip 
V: Specific grip 
 




Even here however, a higher level can be found to formulate 
the shared property of the events involved, namely the fact 
that the actions involve objects. Movements mimicking an 
object related action evoke no response so the shared 
property that gets reflected in the activity of the neuron 
could be labeled as “object-related actions”.  
More levels than the ones mentioned by Gallese et al. 
could be postulated. Theoretically, below the level of grips 
there can be thought to be a level of precise motor 
execution. At this level no shared property can be found that 
gets reflected in the activity of the neurons, as even the most 
fine-grained mirror neurons – the strictly congruent mirror 
neurons – allow for small variations in the execution of an 
action.  
The types of neurons and their lowest common property 
in motor and visual response profile are shown in Table 1. 
The tendency is obvious: when a shared property cannot be 
specified at one level, one can go up one level and use a 
new idiom in which commonalities can be found. It is 
possible to formulate a level of abstraction on which all 
neurons are incongruent, but also a level can be formulated 
on which all neurons are congruent.  
In all, neurons can be made to mirror, in the sense of 
reflecting a common property of two events, by invoking 
levels of description of an increasing abstractness. The 
representational analysis has shown that, when moving 
through the different categories of mirror neurons, the 
representational content becomes of an ever more general 
nature in order to be able to continue speaking of mirroring.  
Vehicle-First Approach 
The continuous search for higher levels of abstraction (from 
action recognition to goal understanding) in which the 
common factor in the observed and performed action can be 
expressed is possibly due to the focus on response profiles 
of individual neurons. This is a logical consequence of the 
original approach taken in the monkey experiments, i.e. 
single cell recordings. In this setup, one presumes a neuron 
to be a vehicle of content and looks for the objects or events 
that it might covary its activity with, whereupon a 
conclusion is drawn regarding the potential content the 
neuron’s firing might carry.  
If one is looking for the representational content of a 
single neuron, one assumes that this single neuron is a 
vehicle by itself. This might be the case for some actions, as 
the discovery of strictly congruent mirror neurons seem to 
suggest, but certainly need not be the case for every action 
and every neuron. There is always a higher level at which 
there is a description of the behavior of the neurons 
possible, but at one point, one may start to wonder whether 
this continuously more abstract interpretation of what 
supposedly gets mirrored is fruitful or warranted.  
Things will become even more problematic when not only 
local coding is considered, but also its contrasting coding 
scheme, distributed coding. In a local coding scheme the 
activity of a single neuron or group of neurons is sufficient 
for representing a certain property (see Van Gelder (1999) 
for an explanation of various types of coding). The 
proverbial “grandmother-neuron” is the most famous 
example of this type of coding. By contrast, in a distributed 
coding scheme an item is represented by the pattern of 
activity over a more than minimal extent of the resources 
available for representing. In this case the pattern of activity 
is the vehicle of the representation, not the individual nodes 
that the vehicle consists of. This type of coding is often 
discussed in the context of neural network models (e.g. Van 
Gelder (1992; 1999)). In distributed representation, there 
need not be a structure where a subpart of the vehicle 
represents a subpart of the content. In that case, the vehicle 
1785
as a whole carries the entire content and the subparts of the 
vehicle do not carry identifiable content by themselves. 
Locating a vehicle without knowledge of the content is 
highly problematic in a distributed, unstructured coding 
scheme.  
To illustrate this, imagine that we have a neural network 
capable of representing various items. And suppose that it 
does so by exhibiting a unique pattern of activation over all 
the units in the network’s output layer. In this case the 
vehicle consists of multiple neurons. There need not be a 
structure in the sense that identifiable subparts of the 
content correspond to identifiable subparts of the vehicle 
(i.e. neurons), in which case a subpart of the vehicle makes 
a contribution to the entire content (again, see Van Gelder 
(1992; 1999) for elaboration on this topic). When we record 
one node in the layer we will not find unequivocal 
representational content because this node does not carry 
any straightforwardly identifiable content by itself.  
With single cell recordings problems might be similar. 
When the interpretation of the representational content of a 
neuron’s activity reaches a level of abstraction of a less 
plausible height, this can suggest that the activity of the 
neuron is part of a distributed representation. In such cases a 
search for the common property to be reflected is neither 
necessary nor likely to produce illuminating results. At 
higher levels of action interpretation it seems more likely 
that neuronal systems rather than individual neurons are 
providing the basic processing elements, so the focus shifts 
from mirror neurons to the mirror neuron system.  
With the widening of the scope, from mirror neurons to 
mirror neuron system, the attributed task grows accordingly. 
More competencies are attributed to the system while, at the 
same time, holding on to the characteristics of individual 
neurons. The problems involved in this strategy will be 
discussed in the next paragraph.  
From Action Recognition to Intention 
Understanding 
As research on mirror neurons and the mirror neuron system 
continued, ever more competencies were attributed to the 
neurons and the system. For instance, mirror neurons are 
generally appreciated as the solid neuronal basis for the 
understanding of actions (Nakahara & Miyashita, 2005; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Recognized specific actions 
are directly related to the motor system which facilitates the 
understanding of these actions or their underlying goals 
(Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 1996). According to 
Rizzolatti et al. (2001) an action is “understood” when its 
observation causes the motor system of the observer to 
resonate. This resonance is supposed to lead to the same 
activity in the motor system as would be the case when the 
observer would perform the action, which facilitates the 
understanding of the observed action. 
Iacoboni et al. (2005) claim that not only is the mirror 
neuron system involved in the understanding of actions, it is 
also used for the detection of intentions of others. They base 
their claim on the fact that activity in areas associated with 
the mirror neuron system is dependent on whether intention 
of an action can be inferred. When an intention has to be 
inferred from a context (cup grasping for drinking versus 
cup grasping for cleaning up), there is a significant increase 
in signal in the parieto-frontal cortical circuit for grasping.  
We have argued that when the representational content of 
mirror neurons gets of an increased level of abstractness, the 
activity of these neurons can no longer be rightfully 
described as mirroring. As argued, the suggestion that 
mirror neurons are basic to action recognition is intuitively 
plausible when applied to the level of specific grips and 
relatively straightforward actions such as grasping, but it is 
quite another thing to suggest that the same basic neuronal 
mechanism underlies such a high level process as intention 
understanding. The goal of an action has to be inferred from 
the recognized action using context (van Rooij, Haselager, 
& Bekkering, in press), past experiences with the observed 
actor (Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2005), and a lot of 
background knowledge. That is an awful lot for a single 
neuron to directly mirror onto the motor system. There 
seems to be too much inference and knowledge consultation 
involved in goal understanding in order to plausibly 
characterize the underlying process as a case of pure 
mirroring. When climbing to higher levels of abstraction, 
the attributed function of the neurons shifts from resonating 
with something readily observable to making inferences 
about a hidden – or at least indirectly observable – feature. 
With every step up, the distance between the attributed 
content and the observed input becomes larger. This 
provides a reason to be skeptical, as the task of the 
individual neuron grows to a questionable size. A lot of 
processing has to take place before these neurons can be 
specific to a particular goal of an action. Also, it is far from 
obvious how a notion as abstract as a goal can be mapped 
directly to a motor system, causing the right resonance to 
occur. 
Of course, Iacoboni et al. do not claim that a single 
neuron is capable of recognizing intentions. Hence they 
speak of a mirror neuron system instead of mirror neurons. 
And naturally, a system may be able to accomplish a task 
that its parts cannot accomplish by themselves. Yet, they 
depict the mirror neuron system as a system consisting of 
mirror neurons and they explain the working of the system 
by describing the working of mirror neurons.  
 
[…] the intentions behind the actions of others can 
be recognized by the motor system using a mirror 
mechanism. Mirror neurons are thought to recognize 
the actions of others, by matching the observed 
action onto its motor counterpart coded by the same 
neurons. (p.533) 
 
The findings of their fMRI based research (the activity in 
the parieto-frontal cortical circuit for grasping is dependent 
on the context) are put against the background of the 
findings with single cell recordings. A claim is made about 
the mirror neuron system, but the explanation is based on 
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mirror neurons. However, the exact relation between mirror 
neurons and a mirror neuron system remains implicit1. The 
working of the mirror neuron system is in need of more 
clarification than the mirroring function of neurons can 
provide. We have argued that it is unlikely that individual 
neurons are capable of mirroring highly abstract categories 
of actions or action goals. So explaining how a mirror 
neuron system is capable of detecting intentions remains an 
open challenge. 
To be sure, we certainly do not wish to dispute the 
findings of Iacoboni et al. After all, people can infer 
intentions from a context, so obviously this is a capacity the 
brain has and Iacoboni et al. have shown that the motor 
system is involved in this. However, we do object to the 
depiction of this capacity as mirroring. Also, this is not to 
say that, for example, broadly congruent mirror neurons of 
type 3 are not involved in intention detection, but rather that 
they are unlikely to provide a similar solid basis as in the 
case of strictly congruent mirror neurons. Results on action 
recognition are in need of further explanation in order to 
support theories on action understanding. Single cell 
recordings cannot carry by themselves the full weight of 
support for theories on action understanding.  
Conclusion 
Debating something trivial as the name of neurons might at 
a first glance come across as a futile matter, not worth the 
entire representational analysis. But it is important to note 
that this is more than just quibbling about the right name for 
these neurons. The working of the neurons does naturally 
not depend on the name we use for describing them. 
However, grouping various kinds of neurons under the label 
mirror neuron can obscure important differences regarding 
their functional contributions to the recognition of actions 
and understanding of goals. When, for example, some 
mirror neurons are supposed to do more than just mirroring, 
this has serious consequences for, for example, the idea that 
the existence of mirror neurons supports the direct matching 
hypothesis. 
Mirror neurons are almost always regarded as carriers of 
representations, but the wide range of representational 
claims about mirror neurons gives rise to conceptual 
difficulties. On the basis of the above analyses, one could 
argue that there is hardly any problem in claiming that 
strictly congruent neurons can be said to mirror, as their 
representational content reflects a property on the relatively 
concrete and observable level of movements. Also, the 
representational content of group 1 broadly congruent 
neurons can be deemed to be on a relatively low and 
unproblematic level of abstraction. More debatable is the 
proper interpretation of the activity of group 2 of the 
broadly congruent neurons. The categories, hand action 
versus non-hand action are of a rather abstract level, as 
                                                          
1 As Dinstein et al. (2008) point out, mirror neurons as defined 
in the single cell studies are very difficult to establish in humans. 
many different actions can be grouped together within such 
categories.  
The level of abstraction involving goals of actions utilized 
to describe neurons in group 3 as being mirror neurons 
seems to be of such a general nature that claims on direct 
observation without inference become dubious. The 
retrieving of a goal involves an evaluation of the context, 
the actor, past experiences with similar situations etc. This 
is a lot of processing to be described as merely mirroring. 
This certainly does not mean that group 3 of the broadly 
congruent neurons and the non-congruent neurons are less 
interesting or less important in the coupling of perception to 
action. On the contrary, as strictly congruent mirror neurons 
represent the action observed or executed and a single 
neuron is not capable of recognizing an action by itself, the 
crucial steps in action recognition must already have been 
taken. Neurons from the broadly congruent or non-
congruent category may very well be part of this action 
recognition mechanism, representing partial contributions to 
unfinished results of the analysis.  
When analyzing the human mirror neuron system, 
researchers often use data from single cell studies in their 
explanation of how the system is able to facilitate action 
recognition, action understanding or goal recognition. 
However, when it is problematic to state that individual 
neurons mirror categories of actions or action goals, as we 
have argued, single cell study findings cannot play the key 
role in explaining the human mirror neuron system without 
further clarification.  
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